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Detail of the Argument in Reply 
REPLY ARGUMENT I. 
Adverse Counsel Asserts Heresy (or Maybe I Mean "Hearsay") 
Over and over and over again, like a whipporill's call, the Real Party 
in Interest iterates the same refrain: To wit, some unidentified clerk of 
the Tooele Justice Court erroneously stated that the requisite filing fee was 
only $70 for appeal of a small claims action to district court for trial de 
novo. To quote verbatim: 
"SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS Defendant Jennifer Castle timely 
paid the filing fee represented to her by the clerk of the Tooele Court.... 
Clerks are assigned the responsibilities to collect fees and do in fact 
represent the amounts of fees to the public. Ms. Castle relied on this 
amount...." (Opposing brief of Defendant/Real Party in Interest at 
p. 10.) 
"ARGUMENT I. Ms. Castle Timely Paid a Portion of the Filing 
Fee in this Matter in Reliance on Statements of Court Personnel.... 
Plaintiffs primary argument in his motion to dismiss the underlying 
appeal from the small claims court and this writ is that Defendant failed 
to properly pay the filing fees in this matter and this case should be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The undisputed facts indicate that 
this mistake was caused by a combination of clerical error and inadver-
tence. " Id. at p. 12. 
Plaintiff's argument ignores the realities of what occurred in this 
case and often occurs, namely clerks give this information out [pertaining 
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to filing fees] all the time and it is universally relied upon....This Court 
noted in Dipoma that a party should be able to rely on the statement of 
Court clerks." Id. at p. 17. 
"As is customary [Customary? So why wasn't a discrepancy in the 
amount due noticed on this occasion?], the undersigned's office called 
the justice court and stated that an appeal was going to be filed and 
requested the amount of the fee. The response was given that the 
amount due was $70.00....[A]nd therefore the error was apparently 
missed by the Justice Court clerks. This error seems to be a combination 
of the mistake by the undersigned's office in failing to send the $10.00, 
and the clerk's office not requesting the payment of the $10.00...." Id. at 
p. 13. 
"9. [Statement of Facts] Defendant, relying on the aforementioned 
facts, failed to pay this additional $10.00 filing fee to the Justice Court 
until February 26, 2003." Id. at p. 8. 
"Defendant's counsel simply failed to pay the full filing fee with the 
notice of appeal due to and [sic] reliance upon the conversation between 
the secretary and the clerk of the court....In the present matter, Defendant 
would lose her opportunity to defend herself and be heard for a mistake 
in failing to pay an additional $10.00 fee, which was an error made by 
both counsel and the clerks of the court." Id. at p. 18. 
"The incorrect amount was paid due the above-referenced error.... 
Counsel's secretary called the clerk to verify the amount due and 
reasonably relied and in fact acted on that statement." Id. at p. 15. 
"As recited above, Defendant timely filed her notice and paid the fee 
requested by the court clerk." Id. at p. 19. "Accordingly, Plaintiff [sic] 
2 
reasonable [sic] relied on the statements of the court clerks...." Id. at 
p. 20. 
"[B]oth this Court and the Court of Appeals have held...that a party 
must be allowed to reasonably rely on the representation of court clerks. 
The facts...stand for the proposition that the court (in that case, the 
Court of Appeals) has the ability to retain jurisdiction over the matter if 
the error of timely filing was due to a clerical error." Id. at p. 20. 
"[T]he error was due to reliance on statements from the clerks of the 
court and the trial court properly allowed the appeal." Id. at p. 25. 
"Her [Real Party in Interest's] only redress on appeal would have 
been her reliance on the court clerks..." Id. at p. 24. 
OR the ancwe, except tor nferlcs and case name, Italics and underlining were 
addedJ 
The Pressing Question Before the Court Is: Shall Hearsay Decide This Case? 
Now Utah Rule of Evidence 801(a) denotes such a claimed oral 
assertion by the purported anonymous clerk as a "statement". And the 
alleged clerk himself is defined in subpart (b) to be a "declarant". 
Thereafter the Rule goes on to gloss "hearsay" as: "'Hearsay' is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in euidence to proue the truth of the matter asserted." 
(See Addendum, Exhibit "C", for copy of Rule.) In other words, what 
evidence is adduced to prove that any clerk ever made such a statement 
to the secretary of the counsel to the Real Party in Interest? Is an 
3 
affidavit of the purported clerk himself (or herself) ever presented? No, 
the evidence of the truthfulness of the asserted matter rests solely upon 
the ipse dixit (that's Latin for "she herself says so") of the secretary on her 
own behalf. (Refer to her affidavit at pp. 79,80, 322 & 323 of record; see 
Addendum, Exhibit "D") 
The Hell of It All Re Hearsay and the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure 
O.k., so let's posit that what we have here is hearsay of a most crimson 
hue. Was an objection to that effect ever lodged with the trial court? 
No, uh-uh. 
Why not? Well, to understand that, you have to appreciate (or at 
least take account of) the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure. Rule 
7(d) provides, "The judge may allow hearsay that is probative, trustworthy and 
credible." 
O.k., so that just moves everything one step down the line, and now 
the question becomes, "Was Janet Layosa's affidavit, albeit hearsay, ever 
objected to as not being probative, trustworthy, or credible?" No, uh-uh. 
Why not? Well, back to the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure 
again—7(d) further stipulates, "The rules of evidence shall not be applied 
Strictly." Now get the fine distinction there: The Rule doesn't say "need 
not". The Rule says "shall not". (Jesus, Joseph and Mary, my most 
fervent desideration would be to stride into a convening of whatever 
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advisory committee formulated those idiotic rules with a freshly honed 
pitchfork, having first padlocked all the exits. Those people are an 
affront to sound intelligence.) 
Iff the rules off evidence are strictly applied, you can stack 
up case law higher than the throne of God to demonstrate conclusively 
that, even as hearsay, Janet Layosa's affidavit should be disallowed on 
the ground that it is not probative, trustworthy, or credible. Witness: 
There is a two-pronged test for determining the admissibility of 
hearsay: f i rst, there must be a showing of unavailability and, 
second, the testimony must bear sufficient indicia of reliability. 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). 
Hearsay is generally not admissible on the ground that it lacks 
trustworthiness for two basic reasons: (1) the person who purports 
to know the facts is not stating them under oath; (2) that person 
is not present for cross-examination. 
State v. Sibert. 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957). 
But Christ in a whorehouse, if you promulgate a rule of procedure 
which says, "The rules of evidence shall not be applied strictly. The judge 
may allow hearsay that is probative, trustworthy and credible.", you've just given 
the judge a license to print money so far as whatever he chooses to deem 
"probative, trustworthy, and credible." With respect to the meaning of 
those terms, if you can't argue with full and complete reliance upon the 
Utah Rules of Evidence and the case law attendant to them, then it's 
5 
anybody's guess and the judge can admit anything he wants, and 
it's impossible to construct a pleading to confute him on the point. 
The Hell of It All Re Discovery and the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure 
O.k., let's review: We've got a case before the Utah Supreme Court 
which apparently is going to be decided based upon the unsupported 
(apart from her own self-assertion) seeming hearsay of a lawyer's 
secretary who says she correctly rang a certain telephone no. (purported-
ly that of the Tooele County Justice Court and not the Psychic Hotline), 
that someone answered claiming to be a clerk (she can't specifically say 
who), and we have her word for it that they distinctly told her the filing 
fee was $70, and she didn't misunderstand them in any way. Oh yeah, 
and the someone who allegedly told her that is unavailable for cross-
examination because she doesn't know their name. And the judge's 
admission of that dubious profession cannot be effectively challenged 
because the pertinent procedural directive is that "The rules of evidence 
shall not be applied strictly." Jesus wept! 
But maybe things aren't quite so dismal as they seem. I mean, so 
what if we don't know precisely which clerk to call and cross-examine? 
After all, how many can there be? Three or four at the most? Why not 
simply subpoena and depose them all? 
Well, those advisory committee dolts who formulated the Utah Rules 
of Small Claims Procedure happened to thwart even that. Rule 6(a) 
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enjoins, "No formal discovery may be conducted...". The question of deposing 
all the justice court clerks was discussed with Judge Skanchy in open 
court and he indicated he was not inclined to allow it. 
The Hell of It All Re Motions and the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure 
It is impossible to properly assess the meaning of any answer to a 
question apart from distinctly knowing what was posed. For example, 
the response "I hate blacks" would denote something entirely different 
coming after the query "Is there any misconception about yourself which 
people have?" than it otherwise might. 
Anyway, THE CRUX of the Real Party in Interest's case is that her law-
yer's secretary WAS MISINFORMED about the proper filing fee due. To 
cite the secretary's affidavit: "I specifically asked the Justice Court Clerk 
what the appropriate filing fee was for an appeal from a Justice Court small 
Claims decision...I was informed that the filing fee would be $70.00...I was 
not told by the Justice Court Clerk of any additional fees to this $70.00." 
However, even when deprived of the ability to challenge this affidavit 
via strict application of the Rules of Evidence (as complained about 
above), I think it could still be held that the secretary's testimony wasn't 
probative ABSENT A YET MORE DEFINITE RECOUNTING OF THE ALLEGED 
ACTUAL QUESTION POSED AND THE EXACT RESPONSE PURPORTEDLY 
PROVIDED BY THE CLERK. Otherwise it might still be that the ostensible 
answer of $70.00 is entirely correct without any misstatement on the part 
7 
of the clerk. 
Very well, so was this objection ever raised and the issue laid at the 
feet of the trial court? No, uh-uh. 
Why not? Well, back to the f****** Utah Rules of Small Claims 
Procedure again. Rule 6(b) provides, "Written motions and responses may be 
filed prior to trial. Motions may be made orally or in writing at the beginning of the 
trial. No motions will be heard prior to trial." 
NOW HOW IN THE HOLY NAME OF F*** could a judge rule 
on a written motion made at the beginning of trial that he hadn't 
had a chance to read, nor the adverse party an opportunity to 
respond to? God bugger me. 
Anyway, procedurally here's what happened: I filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal [for court's lack of jurisdiction] on February 24&, 2003 
(found at pp. 48-63 of record). Thereafter, on February 28*k, 2003, a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal (found 
at pp. 77-88 of record) was filed by the adverse party . IT WAS IN 
CONNECTION WITH THIS FILING that counsel for the adverse party first 
raised the insistence that the counsel's secretary was misinformed as to 
the filing fee, and I intended to challenge this contention. ON THIS 
SAME DATE a notice (found in record at pp. 75-76; see Addendum, Exhibit 
8 
"F") was sent informing the parties that the judge proposed, contrary to 
the procedural rules, to decide this motion at a pretrial conference on 
March 17& . On March 1 1 ^ , realizing that I couldn't adequately be 
prepared by the date of the pretrial conference to reply to the adverse 
party's Memorandum in Opposition, I moved the court for a continuance, 
which was denied. So on Saturday, March 15^, I sent a fax to the judge 
(filed March 17^1; found at pp. 117-123 and 124-130 of record; see 
Addendum, Exhibit "G") saying (in essence), "All right, ya bastard, I 
would be prepared to stipulate to this motion being dealt with at a 
pretrial hearing, because after all, when else are you logically going to 
address a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction? At trial like the 
insane court rules require? But if you're going play hardball with me, 
it's quid pro quo, and I'm putting you on notice that I've never agreed to 
waive any of the relevant rules, and you're out of order to proceed as you 
are." Thus I preserved the issue. 
I assert the foregoing with much emphasis, because counsel for the 
Real Party in Interest has charged at p. 15 of his opposing brief: 
"Counsel's secretary called the clerk to verify the amount due and 
reasonably relied and in fact acted on that statement. Plaintiff chal-
lenges this fact, however, he has not properly disputed it here or in the 
court below....First, no counter affidavit was filed in the trial court." 
And at p. 16 thereof, "In the trial court he only asserted that the 
9 
undersigned's secretary is a liar." 
But the countervailing facts are these: 
1.) I could not challenge Janet Layosa's affidavit on the ground 
that it is hearsay, because hearsay is admissible in a small claims 
action. 
2.) Apart from a strict application of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
something not allowed under the procedural rules, it was virtually 
impossible to attack it as hearsay which is not "probative, trustworthy, 
or credible". 
3.) And although I might have been able to defeat it by showing at 
the time of trial that it wasn't "probative"— because neither Janet 
Layosa's alleged query to the clerk nor the clerk's purported answer 
were ever adequately delineated in the affidavit— I wasn't able to do 
even that because the procedural rules weren't followed regarding 
the disposition of motions in a small claims action. A further motion 
for reconsideration was presented at trial, but under the strictures 
consequent to such a pleading, only the issues of the original motion 
as heard and denied by the court could be revisited. 
IT IS NOTEWORTHY that both Petitioner and Real Party in Interest 
reach concordance on this: If not that I preserved the issue, then at least 
that this "responsive letter" (as her counsel terms it) was in lieu of any 
other counter contention. As the brief of the Real Party in Interest 
concurs at p. 9 under "Statement of Facts": 
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"11. Plaintiff did not file a reply memorandum, but filed a 
responsive letter [March 15 fax to judge] with various attachments. See 
Record 96-130 [bolder typeface added] 
"12. Plaintiff filed no counter affidavits alleging that the clerks 
made no such statements to defense counsel's secretary." 
Now there's an old Chinese proverb (really): The antidote for poison 
is yet more poison (sort of their way of saying "fight fire with fire"). And 
what adverse counsel suggests is that I should have matched a Roland for 
an Oliver and refuted Janet Layosa's hearsay affidavit with a hearsay 
affidavit of my own, asserting that the justice court clerks had related to 
me the very opposite of what she was claiming. 
REPLY ARGUMENT II. 
Innocence Is No Excuse (or Is That "Ignorance" Rather?) 
What constitutes (in the sense of a proscription against giving it) 
"legal advice"? Well, there seems to be a paucity of Utah jurispru-
dence defining it, but there's no lack of federal case law. Well, to start 
with, ANY statement intended to apprise or admonish another in respect 
of the law such as "That's illegal; report it to the police" or "You ought 
to sue the bums" qualifies as legal advice. But some legal advice 
rises to the level of "the unauthorized practice of law", and some does 
not. Disciplinary Counsel v. Palmer, 761 N.E.2d 716 (Ohio 2001). 
HEREAFTER only illustrations embracing "legal advice" which can 
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subject someone to that liability will be cited. 
DEFINITIONALLY HOWEVER, all authorities agree that for a jural 
propoundment to be deemed "legal advice" it must possess TWO 
QUALITIES. NO. 1, it has to be directed toward expounding rights and 
obligations. FOR EXAMPLE, let's suppose I bump into Justice Durrant 
one day and I pose to him, "What's the difference between murder and 
manslaughter? I've never understood that distinction." For the next six 
hours he can laboriously explicate the contrast in minute detail, and such 
a discourse couldn't get him in any hot water. HOWEVER, If I were to 
ask, "Could I be prosecuted if I did this?", that's completely dissimilar, 
because in that instance he'd be delineating rights and responsibilities to 
me. (And please take heed that the question of any filing fee that it is 
incumbent upon a person to pay certainly denotes a "legal responsibil-
ity".) 
NO. 2, in order to be considered "legal advice" a jural propoundment 
has to be interpretive of the law. FOR EXAMPLE, if Justice Durrant were 
to say to me, "Whenever you operate a motor vehicle, the law says you 
must do so safely", that is NOT a statement that could be deemed "legal 
advice" even though it clearly states a legal obligation on my part. NOR 
would "If someone libels you, you can sue them" qualify, even though a 
legal right is thereby presented. HOW COME? Because neither of these 
statements is genuinely interpretive of the law. However, if Justice 
Durrant were to say, "When you pull across the centerline to pass 
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someone, you may exceed the posted speed limit in order to do so as 
quickly as possible", that involves both statement of a right and an 
interpretation of law, and therefore fits the definition of "legal advice". 
And when a clerk declares to someone, "The requisite filing fee is $70", 
that too is an interpretation of the law. 
BEAR IN MIND that it is not the complexity or simplicity of an 
utterance which determines whether or not it is interpretive of the law 
rather it is the nature of the statement. For example, in the case of In re 
Herren, 138 B.R. 989 at 995 (Bkrtcy.D.Wyo. 1992) (see Addendum, Exhibit 
"H") , it was actually maintained, "Further, the court finds and 
concludes that the [alleged unauthorized practitioner's] exhortation to 
'please don't delay...your debt problem will not go away..unless you act 
NOW, is itself giving legal advice." (Mother of God! You gotta be 
kiddin' me!) 
ANOTHER CONSIDERATION serving to determine if giving "legal 
advice" subjects someone to liability for "the unauthorized practice of 
law" is whether it is directed to a specific individual or not. FOR 
EXAMPLE, let's suppose Associate Chief Justice Durrant is featured as a 
speaker at a convention of the American Bar Association. And there he 
addresses the throng and says, "I'm convinced that military conscription 
is an abrogation of the constitutional guarantee against involuntary 
servitude, and that no citizen is obliged to comply with a draft notice." If 
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I ran down to the Judicial Conduct Commission with a copy of his 
remarks and protested, "Look at this; old man Durrant is going so far as to 
dispense legal advice to every man jack in America", they'd laugh me to 
scorn and respond, "Well, if it ever gets to the point where he's directing 
himself to some distinct person, let us know. But until then...." 
HOWEVER, if I were to call him up on the telephone and say, "Guess 
what, Matt, I've been ordered to report for induction", and he replied, 
"You [and I emphasize YOU meaning Clif Panos] are not bound to do so if 
I know anything about the law", he could sure get sanctioned for that as 
a sitting jurist. Because then he'd be furnishing instruction to an 
identifiable individual as to their legal rights and responsibilities. 
LIKEWISE, if a court or judicial authority disseminates legal informa-
tion TO THE COMMUNITY AT LARGE, that's o.k.. For example, if you go 
to the Utah State Courts' web site (www.utcourts.gov), they've got tons 
and tons of this "be your own lawyer" crap on there, like: 
Pro Se Guide to Appeals Procedures 
(http://www. utcourts. aov/courts/appell/prose.htm). 
Pro Se Guide to Filing Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
(http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/forms/certi/prose.htm), and 
Glossary of Legal Terms 
(http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/glossary.htm). 
In fact, to relate the purpose of all this in their own words, "In an effort to 
educate and inform court users, Utah's State Courts have created a web 
based resource to address frequently asked questions as well as provide 
step-by-step instructions on how to complete common court procedures." 
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(Italics and underlining added). 
Now for the sake of further elucidation, let's consider the last of those 
self-help resources listed above, the Glossary of Legal Terms. Sweet 
jumpin' Jesus, DO YOU REALIZE that in the case of In re Kaitangian, 218 
B.R. 102 at 111 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal. 1998) (see Addendum, Exhibit "I"), the 
federal courts have held, "In connection with preparing legal 
documents,...providing clients with explanations or definitions of such 
legal terms of art as 'reaffirmation' is, by itself, the giving of 'legal 
advice [which may subject non-attorney to liability for the 
'unauthorized practice of law']." And there Kaitangian gave as 
precedent In re Herren (previously cited above), in which it was held at 
994-995, "In connection with preparing legal documents, such as the 
[bankruptcy] schedules, providing clients with definitions of such legal 
terms of art as 'creditors holding secured claims/ 'real property,7 
'executory contracts,' and the like is, by itself, giving legal advice." And 
at 995, "[D]efining terms in the schedules...require[s] exercise of legal 
judgment beyond the capacity and knowledge of lay persons." 
AND IF YOU THINK THAT'S NITPICKING, GET A LOAD 
OF THIS: In the case of In re Landry, 268 B.R. 301 at 304 
(Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 2001) (see Addendum, Exhibit "J"), it was actually 
maintained, "The very act of directing [someone] to review a particular 
section of a legal book, in and of itself, constitutes 'legal advice/ [which 
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non-attorney is prohibited from purveying]." HOWEVER, that must be 
qualified by pointing out that it was noted in Kaitangian at 109, "In 
deciding whether an eviction service was engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law, the appellate court in People v. Landlords Professional 
Services, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1599,1608, 264 Cal. Rptr. 548 (4th Dist. 1989) 
found:...'merely giving a client a manual, even a detailed one containing 
specific advice, for the preparation of an unlawful detainer action and the 
legal incidence of an eviction would not be the practice of law if the service 
did not personally advise the client with regard to a specific case/" (italics 
and underlining added). And this aspect of Landlords' Professional 
Services, regarding which Kaitangian remarked at 113 that the "[C]ourt 
found personal contact was a key factor in finding defendant was engaged in 
the unauthorized practice of law" (underlining added), was commented 
upon again in n. 13 thereto: "The court in Landlords' Professional Services 
reviewed similar cases in other jurisdictions. For example, in Oregon State 
Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Ore. 552, 538 P. 2d 913 (1975) the court concluded that 
it was not an unauthorized practice of law to advertise and sell divorce kits so 
long as the service had no personal contact with a client. In New York 
Lawyers' Assn. v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 
(1967), the court found sale of Norman F. Dacey's book 'How to Avoid 
Probate' was not an unauthorized practice of law since there was no personal 
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contact or relationship with any particular individual...." (underlining 
added). AND HENCE I emphasize that the alleged questioning of some 
court clerk on the telephone by the adverse counsel's secretary, as 
opposed to pro se legal guides being furnished impersonally on the Utah 
State Courts' web site, weighs heavily in the assertion that the clerk 
improperly gave legal advice to the secretary. 
BY ALL T H A T MEN CALL HOLY, DO Y O U MEAN TO TELL 
ME that if I were to ring up Pat Bartholomew or Matty Branch and 
inquire, "So what does the term 'collateral estoppel' denote?", they 
couldn't (under U.S. law at least) give me their version of whatever they 
think it means, BECAUSE that would be rendering "LEGAL ADVICE"? Or, 
if I were to call and ask, "Where the hell does it say I have to file 10 
copies of my brief?", for the same reason Pat couldn't just fax me a copy 
of Utah Appellate Procedure Rule 26 with subpart (b) circled? TECHNI-
CALLY, NO! 
How then can that precise information be disseminated on the Utah 
State Courts' web site? Or how can they propagate on there a Glossary 
of Legal Terms? BECAUSE IN THAT INSTANCE THE JUDICATURE IS 
DIRECTING INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC AS A WHOLE, AND NOT 
RESPONDING TO A SPECIFIC LITIGANT'S INQUIRY. This rationale 
upholding the Utah State Courts' web site is predicated upon "New York 
County Lawyers' Association v. Dacey [see Addendum, Exhibit " M " ) , 28 
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A.D.2d 161,283 N.Y.S.2d 984, reversed and dissenting opinion adopted 21 
N.Y.2d 694, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967), which held that 
the publication of forms and instructions on their use does not constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law if these instructions are addressed to the public 
in general rather than to a specific individual legal problem....Other states 
have adopted the principle of law set forth in Dacey, holding that the sale of 
legal forms with instructions for their use does not constitute unauthorized 
practice of law. See State Bar of Michigan v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 249 
N.W.2d 1 (1976); Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Or. 552, 538 P.2d 913 
(1975). However, these courts have prohibited all personal contact between 
the service providing such forms and the customer...." Citing (underlining 
added) Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d. 1186 at 1191 (Fla. 1978) (see 
Addendum, Exhibit "K"). Nevertheless contrarily, "The Supreme Court of 
Florida has taken a different view and has held that the giving of specialized 
advice to a general audience rather than to a particular individual constitutes 
the practice of law. See The Florida Bar v. American Legal & Business 
Forms, Inc., 274 So.2d 225 (Fla.1973) and The Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 
So.2d 683 (Fla.1974)." Citing (underlining added) Gilchrist (see Addendum, 
Exhibit "L") at 918. 
Does that mean, as the attempted reductio ad absurdum on p. 16 of 
adverse counsel's brief suggests, that if I sashay up to the front counter 
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and try to file a nonconforming brief, Pat Bartholomew can't say, 
"PURSUANT TO R.App.P. 27(e), your brief is rejected for filing", because 
such a statutory reference constitutes a provision of "legal advice"? NO, 
that's o.k., because in that instance Pat Bartholomew would not be 
advising me as to a right, duty, responsibility, or obligation which 1 have, 
but a right, duty, responsibility, or obligation which SHE has. Also, she 
would be making a public pronouncement on behalf of the Court. Even 
if we were the only two people in the office at the time, it doesn't matter. 
It would still be a public pronouncement made on behalf of the Court. 
However, if she were later to mail me a copy of Rule 27(e) with a note on 
it saying, "You need to read this", that would be an improper private 
communication between her and me AND a prohibited affordment of 
legal advice. 
LIKEWISE, if the lawyers' secretary Janet Layosa rings up a clerk of 
the Tooele Justice Court and inquires, with respect to the amount of the 
filing fee she must submit, what her legal responsibility is. ONLY 
LICENSED ATTORNEYS ARE ALLOWED TO AUTHORITATIVELY ADVISE 
INDIVIDUALS WHAT THEIR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE. The 
clerk may accede to voice his opinion on the point, but in doing so he 
enters into private communication with a litigant and is not speaking 
publicly on behalf of the Court. Ignorance is no excuse, and the Court 
does not provide legal apprisement, and if Janet Layosa turns to a clerk 
for guidance because she doesn't know the statutory provisions, fine. 
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But she cannot raise an objection of ineffective assistance of counsel if 
the non-attorney advice she gets from the clerk turns out to be wrong. 
REPLY ARGUMENT III. 
Exhibits "H" and "I" of Opposing Brief Attempt to Dupe Court 
The Real Party in Interest clamors for the Court to take note of the 
putatively misleading and incomplete information on relevant filing fees 
provided on the Utah State Courts' web site. At pp. 9-10 of opposing 
counsel's brief, under the heading "Statement of Facts", these points are 
alleged: 
"17. Court personnel list the filing fees on the State Court Web Site 
as well as provide the public, including attorneys, a schedule of filing 
fees. The fees listed on the website prior to the May 2003 changes stated: 
'Trial de novo $70.00' with no distinction between small claims 
departments of district courts and small claims decisions of the justice 
courts. See Fee Schedule from State Court's Website, attached to 
Addendum of Defendant and marked as Exhibit 'H\ 
"18. The current fee schedule form produced by the State Court 
System and given to the public, including the undersigned's office states: 
'Trial De Novo (Justice or Small Claims Court) $75.00' See Fee 
Schedule produced by State Courts, attached to Addendum to Defendant 
and marked as Exhibit 'I'." 
(italics and double underlining added in both instances above) 
GEE, SOUNDS SERIOUS, MAYBE WE BETTER TAKE A LOOK, starting 
with Exhibit "I". There, up at the top of the page, the fee schedule is 
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clearly captioned "DISTRICT COURT Effective May 5, 2003". Wow, I 
wonder if maybe when the fee schedule says, "Trial De Novo (Justice or 
Small Claims Court) $75.00", it means the fee in district court is $75.^°-. 
regardless of whether the appeal is from the district court's small claims 
department or from a justice court? GOSH, MAYBE Exhibit "H" CAN GIVE 
US A HINT. 
The heading of this fee schedule clearly says. "Utah Code Annotated 
§78-7-35; Filing Fees". And if you reference this schedule on the actual 
website (at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/Fees.htm), you'll notice 
there's a link there to the actual statute. Click on that, and here's what 
you'll read: 
78-7-35. Civil fees Of the COUftS of record- Courts complex design. 
(1) (a) The fee for filing any civil complaint or petition invoking the 
jurisdiction of a court of record not governed by another subsection 
is $155. 
(b) The fee for filing a complaint or petition is: 
(i) $50 if the claim for damages or amount in interpleader exclusive 
of court costs, interest, and attorney fees is $2,000 or less; 
[statute truncated here; italics, underlining, and use of bolder type added] 
O.k., so what's going on here at the Utah State Courts' Web site? 
What it boils down to is there's this whole long laundry list of proceedings 
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and functions pertaining to district court. And you've got fees listed for 
various writs and expungements and abstracts and probate stuff and 
divorce and child custody matters and tort suits and whatnot, and just 
basically all this sh** that a justice court (which is not a court of record) 
isn't involved with. SO CONSEQUENTLY THE STATUTE DEALING WITH 
DISTRICT COURT FILINGS FEES IS LONG AND CONVOLUTED AND GOES 
ON FOR PAGE AFTER PAGE IN THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. So what 
the Utah State Courts' web site has graciously and conveniently done IS 
TAKE THIS STATUTE AND RENDER IT IN GRAPHIC FORM, i.e., MAKE A 
PICTURE OUT OF IT for those pro se litigants who are reading impaired. 
ALL RIGHT, SO WHY DIDN'T THEY DO THE SAME DAMNED THING with 
U.C.A. §78-6-14, the statute dealing with justice court filing fees? 
BECAUSE §78-6-14 is so f****** simple that anybody can understand it, 
even in just words alone, maybe even a lawyer. It doesn't need to be 
portrayed in graphic or pictorial form. All it says is: 
"78-6-14. Civil filing fees. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, the fees for a small 
claims action in justice court shall be the same as provided in 
Section 78-7-35... 
(4) The fee in the justice court for filing a notice of appeal for 
trial de novo in a court of record is $10...." [italics added] 
IN OTHER WORDS, when the Utah State Courts put those charts on 
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their web site, they weren't trying to represent to the public, "Look, these 
are all the statutes that have anything to do with filing fees." All they 
were attempting was to take some of the HARD TO FOLLOW ones and 
make them more comprehensible to all the trailer-park white trash out 
there wanting to get restraining orders against their deadbeat boyfriends 
and so on. 
REPLY ARGUMENT IV. 
Proper Fathoming of Pari Materia Refutes Adverse Party's Case Law 
At various places in his opposing brief, adverse counsel refers to 
the "incorporation" of one statute or rule into another. To wit: 
At p. 10, "Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure did not 
incorporate Rule 4-803 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration." 
At p. 11, "For these same reasons, the District Court did not disregard 
Rule 4-803 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. This Rule is 
not incorporated into Rule 12 of the rules of Small Claims Procedure." 
At p. 14, "The Court noted [in Dipoma v. McPhie] that these sections 
[such as was previously stated, "Utah Code Ann. §21-1-5 (now 
renumbered as 78-7-35)"] were not incorporated into the Rule 3 
governing the filing of complaints and that no payment was required 
to invoke jurisdiction." 
At p. 15, "Rule 4-803(2)(D) of the Rules of Judicial Administration 
requires fees to be paid to invoke jurisdiction. However, as in 
Dipoma, this Rule is not incorporated into Rule 12 of the Rules of 
Small Claims Procedure." 
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And finally at p. 20, "Defendant [Castle] would first submit that the 
District Court did not ignore the requirements of Rule 4-803. As 
argued above, Rule 4-803 does require the filing of the fee. For the 
reasons set forth in Part I, Rule 12 does not incorporate Rule 4-803. 
Accordingly, the filing fee was not jurisdictional and the district court 
properly conducted the de novo trial." 
(except for the case name, italics and underlining were added in all 
instances above) 
Since the conclusion propounded by this last statement reveals that 
opposing counsel presents an argument to this Court predicated in large 
measure upon the thesis that Small Claims Rule 12 does not incorporate 
C.J.A. Rule 4-803. there are two questions to be taken up in rebuttal: 
1.) Does the doctrine of pari materia not dictate that Small Claims 
Rule 12 must be construed in conjunction with C.J.A. Rule 4-803? 
2.) If such is the case, then why did the Court in Dipoma hold that 
R.Civ.P. 3(a) was not likewise so affected by statutes similarly connected 
with it? 
THE ANSWERS TO BOTH OF THESE QUESTIONS LIE IN A CLEAR 
UNDERSTANDING OF PARI MATERIA. In addressing this doctrine, the 
prominent authority of Sutherland Statutory Construction has been 
heavily relied upon. Hereafter excerpts quoted from it are cited by page 
no. with reference to the sixth edition by Norman J. Singer, 2000 revision, 
and photocopies of such are in the Addendum. All are extracted from 
volume 2B, §51.01 "Interpretive relevance of related statutes", §51.02 
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"Statutes on the same subject construed together", and §51.03 "Statutes 
deemed to be in pari materia". To wit: 
"Statutes are considered to be in pari materia [the 4th ed. 1984 
additionally has at this point "and thus must be construed together"] 
when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of 
persons or things, or have the same purpose or object." 
(pp. 201-202; see Addendum, Exhibit "N") 
The Utah Supreme Court, quoting the above excerpt from the 4th ed. 
1984 at p. 467 in Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985), 
continued on, 
"If it is natural or reasonable to think that the understanding of the 
legislature or of persons affected by the statute would be influenced by 
another statute, then those statutes should be construed to be in pari 
materia, construed with reference to one another and harmonized if 
possible/' (underlining and italics added; footnotes omitted). 
In Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, 65 P.3d 1184, the Utah Supreme Court 
referred to a citation from the 4th ed. 1973 "...for the proposition that legisla-
tures know of statutes of related subject matter and have them in mind when 
enacting new statutes.../' (underlining added). 
These same canons of interpretation were voiced again in 
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Ut. App. 1988): 
"It is presumed the Legislature intends to achieve a consistent body of 
law. 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09, at 332 (4th 
ed. 1985). Thus, statutes relating to the same subject matter 'should be 
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construed with reference to each other and harmonized, if possible/ so 
that effect is given to every provision of the statutory scheme." 
(citation omitted and underlining and italics added). 
K[E]ach section of a law which deals with the same subject matter 
must be read in pari materia with other sections on the same 
subject." (p. 202; see Addendum, Exhibit "N") 
K[G]ourts have held that application of the rule must be applied 
before any other rules of statutory construction." 
(p. 235; underlining added; see Addendum, Exhibit "O") 
"The rule that legislative provisions which are pari materia 
should be construed together applies also to rules of court." 
(p. 185; underlining and italics added; see Addendum, Exhibit "P") 
This is determinative to the illation that Small Claims Rule 12 
must be read in pari materia with U.C.A. §78-6-14(4) and C.J.A. 
Rule 4-803(2)(D). 
T o r example, it has been held that Rules of Civil Procedure 
promulgated by a Supreme Court have the same force and effect as 
statutes passed by the legislature.30 
30Pennsylvania. The statutory provision and the Rules of Civil Procedure 
relate to the same subject matter, partition of property, and therefore should be 
read in pari materia. Lohmiller v. Weidenbaugh, 503 Pa. 329,469 A.2d 578 (1983)." 
(p. 233; underlining and italics added; see Addendum, Exhibit "Q") 
"To be in pari materia, statutes need not...refer to one another." 
(p. 235; see Addendum, Exhibit "O") 
So it'd certainly prove decisive if Small Claims Rule 12 were to say, 
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"The appropriate fee, as provided in U.C.A. 5578-6-14(4) 
and 78-7-35, must accompany the Notice of Appeal", or, 
"Pursuant to C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2) (P) . the appropriate fee 
must accompany the Notice of Appeal". 
However, it may not be inferred from a lack of such direct reference 
that the conjoint statute and rules are not to be construed together. 
An example of this rule made operative is to be found in Utah 
County v. Orem City further on at pp. 709 and 710: 
''The—statutes mentioned—have as a common purpose the identifica-
tion of those who may use county jails and who must bear the costs of that 
use. Thus, these statutes should be construed with reference to one 
another and harmonized if possible....[S]ection 17-22-9 (federal prisoners) 
and section 10-13-23 (town prisoners), neither of which is mentioned in 
section 17-22-8, require that the county be compensated for the expense of 
boarding those prisoners. Therefore, it is only reasonable that the cities 
also could be required to compensate the county for incarceration of city 
prisoners even though such a requirement is not specifically mentioned in 
section 17-22-8." (underlining and italics added). 
O.K., SO HOW COME, AS ADVERSE COUNSEL CORRECTLY POINTS 
OUT, THE COURT IN DIPOMA HELD THAT R.Civ.P. 3(a), RELATING TO 
FILING A COMPLAINT. DOES NOI INCORPORATE U.C.A. §21-1-5 (now 
renumbered as 78-7-35), RELATING TO THE FILING FEE THEREFOR? 
Well, to realize why, you have to understand two further wrinkles in 
the doctrine of pari materia. To wit: 
"When the language of a state act [or rule] is adopted from 
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federal legislation [or procedural provisions], courts will ordinarily 
construe the state statute [or rule] in accordance with the construc-
tion given the federal statute [or rule]." 
(p. 188; see Addendum, Exhibit "R") 
And of utmost importance to comprehend the honorable Court's 
holding in Dipoma: 
"But if words [or provisions] used in a prior statute... are omit-
ted, it will be presumed that a change of meaning was intended." 
(p. 199; see Addendum, Exhibit "S") 
"...'where a statute [or rule], with reference to one subject 
contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a 
similar statute [or rule] concerning a related subject is significant 
to show that a different intention existed."* 
(pp. 199-201; underlining added in both instances) 
Two cases are footnoted at p. 188 of Sutherland to illustrate this point: 
"
14United States. ...The deliberate selection of language so differing from 
that used in earlier Acts indicates that a change of law was intended. Gutierres de 
Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417,115 S. Ct. 2227,132 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1995). 
...Idaho. The amendment recognizes that the main purpose of punitive 
damages (deterrence) is destroyed when the wrongdoer dies. The fact that a simi-
lar amendment was not made to the later statute is evidence that the legislature 
did not intend to allow living wrongdoers to escape the imposition of punitive 
damages. Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980) (overruled on other 
grounds by, Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986))." 
WITH THE ABOVE FIRMLY IN MIND, ALL THAT REMAINS TO ATTAIN A 
CORRECT GRASP OF THE HONORABLE COURT'S HOLDING IN DIPOMA v. 
McPHIE IS TO CITE THEREFROM. To wit: 
" 1 1 1 This court has not addressed the issue [as presented in 
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Dipoma] of whether the payment of filing fees is a jurisdictional 
requirement for commencing an action at the trial level. However, this 
court has addressed whether filing fees are jurisdictional on appeal. In 
doing so, this court has.consistently looked to the plain language of the 
applicable rule when construing it, thereby declining to read additional 
language into the rule. For example, in Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984), this court addressed the question of 
whether payment of docketing fees is a jurisdictional requirement under 
rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governed the filing of 
appeals prior to 1985. [And quoting the honorable Court's holding in 
State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125 at 1128 (Utah 1985), "We more recently 
reviewed this issue in Prowswood...and concluded that failure to pay 
the filing fee within the requisite period is a defect of jurisdictional 
magnitude."] Rule 73 stated in pertinent part: 'A party may appeal 
from a judgment by filing with the district court a notice of appeal, together 
with sufficient copies thereof..., and depositing therewith the fee required for 
docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court/ Id. at 954-55 (quoting Utah R. 
Civ. P. 73(a)). In determining whether rule 73's docketing fee requirement 
was jurisdictional, the Prowswood court distinguished rule 73 from rule 3 
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which set forth only the 
requirement that an appellant must file a notice of appeal, and then stated: 
'Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only 
for such action as the court of appeals deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal/ Id. at 958 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Fed.R.App. P. 3(a)). The Prowswood court concluded that the plain 
language of rule 73, unlike rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, expressly made both the notice of appeal and the docketing fee 
requirement jurisdictional. See id. at 959. 
"% 12 However, on January 1,1985, rule 73 was superseded by rule 3 
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of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3, like rule 3 of the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, contained no express reference to payment 
of the docketing fee at the time of filing as a jurisdictional requirement. 
Accordingly, because the language making payment of filing fees a juris-
dictional requirement had been removed, this court, in State v. Johnson, 
held that '[u]nder Rule 3, the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the 
district court to this Court is no longer jurisdictional/ 700 P.2d 1125,1129 n. 
1 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). 
"113 ... See Hausknect v. Indus. Comm'n, 882 P.2d 683, 684-85 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994) (holding payment of required fees jurisdictional under Utah 
Rule Appellate Procedure 14, where rule stated that '[a]t time of filing any 
petition for review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of 
the appellate court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee 
for docketing the appeal' (emphasis added) (quoting Utah R.App. P. 
14(b)))." (The language of this rule hasn't changed and it still obtains.) 
(internal quotations omitted; underlining added in all instances above) 
(quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, 29 P.3d 1225 at 1228,1229) 
And the Court of Appeals gave this restatement of the foregoing in 
Raiser v. Buirley, a case adduced in the adverse party's brief to evince a 
pivotal point thereof: 
" i 5 Following adoption of the current rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that timely payment 
of the filing fee for appeal is not jurisdictional. See State v. Johnson, 700 
P.2d 1125,1129 n. 1 (Utah 1985) (holding plain language of rule 3(a) estab-
lishes that 'the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the district court 
to this court is no longer jurisdictional')/' (underlining and bolder type-
30 
face added; quoting Raiser v. Buirley, 2002 UT App 277, 54 P.3d 650). 
Although a very careful reading of the above is necessary to observe 
the contrast, in Dipoma v. McPhie the Court was addressing the issue of 
whether the filing fee was a jurisdictional requisite under Civil Procedure 
Rule 3(a), and in State v. Johnson it undertook whether the fee was juris-
dictional per Appellate Procedure Rule 3(a). Insomuch as neither of 
these rules contained a plain language mandate of fees, the Court held in 
both cases that the only jurisdictional requirement was either the filing 
of a complaint in the first instance or a notice of appeal in the latter. 
However, in Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99,17 P.3d 1110, the 
question at bar was which section of Appellate Procedure Rule 3 should 
govern? As the Court phrased the matter at U17 of its holding, 
"Parkinson relies on rule 3(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for her 
position. The Gorostietas counter that rule 3(a) is dispositive...." (contrasting 
bolder typeface added) 
Thereafter, at U 19 of Gorostieta, the Court offers an analysis as to 
which section controls, but it significantly concludes by harking back to 
the Court's determination of this rule in State v. Johnson — namely that, 
in the permutation of the former R.C/V.P. 73 into the present R.App.P. 3, 
the omission of prior express language which made the filing fee 
jurisdictional must be taken as intending a change of meaning in the rule 
in that regard. And this is in keeping with the precepts of the doctrine of 
31 
pari materia. 
But observe this variance very carefully: Whereas 
distinct omission of a prior provision from a succeeding 
embodiment of a statute/rule, or even from a similar, 
related statute/rule, must be taken to indicate a 
contrasting intended meaning of the legislature in such 
cases, this DOES NOT MEAN that if a provision appears in 
one related statute/rule, but is absent from another, 
then the statutes/rules cannot be read in pari materia to 
give effect to all provisions of each. Perhaps juxtaposing two 
differing principles relied upon by the Utah Court of Appeals in the 1995 
case of State in Interest ofR.N.J., 908 P.2d 345 at pp. 348 and 349, will 
serve to enunciate this contrast: 
"[Olur conclusion is consistent with the general principle 'that when 
two statutory provisions conflict, the more specific provision will prevail 
over the more general provision/ Williams v. Public Ser'v. Cotntn'n,, 754 
P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988)/' 
"Our conclusion is also supported by the principle that 'the later 
expression of the legislature' controls when statutes conflict or overlap in 
their treatment of the same subject matter....(quoting 2A C. Sands, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 51.02 at 290 (4th ed. 1973)). " (internal 
quotations and citation omitted) 
The preceding two prescripts are not specifying the same thing, and 
the former of them, which crucially bears upon the assertion that Small 
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Claims Rule 12 must be read in pari materia with U.C.A. §78-6-14(4) and 
C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2)(D). was given prior expression by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 
Utah 84, 79 P.2d 25 (1938): 
"The rule, however, is that, where there is a general provision and a 
specific one, the specific must be given full effect. 11 Am.Jur. 663. This 
rule of statutory construction was upheld in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
County, 60 Utah 423, 209 P. 207, wherein it was said (page 208): "Further, it 
is an elementary doctrine that, where two statutes treat of the same 
subject-matter, the one general and the other special in its provisions, the 
special provisions control the general. State ex rel. Morck v. White, 41 
Utah 480,126 P. 330; Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382,59 P. 524, 77 Am.St.Rep. 
917; University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P. 96,77 Am.St.Rep. 
928; Crane v. Reeder, 22 Mich. 322/' 
Desitively, a succinct summation of the foregoing argument can 
perhaps be found in this citation from Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 
1318 (Utah 1983): 
"In construing these two statutes, we rely on another well-established 
rule of statutory construction, which provides: 
'[I]t is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a 
provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same 
subject matter, wherefore it is held that in the absence of any 
express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision was 
enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in these 
prior statutes, and they should all be construed together.f..] 
'Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be 
compared with the new provision; and if possible by reasonable 
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construction, both are to be so construed that effect is given to 
every provision in all of them.9 
2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 290 (4th ed. 1973). 
Sections [being reviewed by the court] are in pari materia....T\ms. these 
statutes should be construed with reference to each other." 
(internal quotation truncated; underlining added in all instances 
throughout) 
SO IN CONCLUSION, as was previously expounded concerning 
this decretum of statutory construction, "To be in pari materia, statutes 
need not...refer to one another." Even at TJ10 of its holding in Dipoma, 
the Court was careful to observe this qualification: "Dipoma argues, in 
response, that rule 3 contains no language requiring filing fees, nor expressly 
incorporates sections 21-1-1, 21-1-5, or 21-7-2 of the Utah Code.../' (bolder 
typeface added). AND IT IS POSITED IN THE PRESENT MATTER THAT 
PARI MATERIA ALSO REQUIRES that Utah Small Claims Procedure Rule 
12 MUST BE construed with U.C.A. §78-6-14(4) and C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2)(D) 
AND CANNOT be taken alone. 
REPLY ARGUMENT V. 
Ignoring All Other Considerations, Appeal Filed Coram Non Judice 
In the foregoing section of argument, much effort was expended to 
show that the case law as cited by adverse counsel, viz., Dipoma v. 
McPhie and Gorostieta v. Parkinson, would not support the assertions of 
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his opposing brief at pp. 12 and 13-14 respectively that: 
"[T]he Utah Appellate Courts have recognized that failure to pay the 
proper amount of the filing fee does not divest a court of jurisdiction, 
but requires that the filing fee be paid correctly within a reasonable 
period of time." 
Or, "The Utah Appellate Courts have held that timely filing of a 
notice of appeal or complaint in the trial court is jurisdictional, however 
the proper payment of the filing fee is not required if the payment of the 
fee is paid within a reasonable time." 
For it has been countered inter alia, that the essential factor in conflict 
with these declarations of adverse counsel was pointed out and made 
clear by his own remark on Dipoma at p. 14 of his opposing brief, "In 
sum, the Court noted that in the absence of language mandating that a fee 
be paid prior to creating jurisdiction, the filing should be permitted." 
(underscoring added to highlight a critical aspect). 
HOWEVER, in citing the case of Raiser v. Buirley, adverse counsel 
raises a different contention. To wit: LET US SUPPOSE THAT PAYMENT 
OF THE FILING FEE WITHIN THE REQUISITE PERIOD WAS INDEED 
INDISPENSABLE FOR JURISDICTION. NEVERTHELESS, IF A TENDERED 
AMOUNT, ALBEIT DEFICIENT, WAS SO PAID TO THE COURT CLERK, DID 
THE CLERK NOT HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROMPTLY CALL THIS 
TO THE PROFFEROR'S ATTENTION. IN ORDER THAT THE MISTAKE MIGHT 
HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENTLY REMEDIED? 
35 
Well, this reflection might prove very compelling apart from one most 
salient fact the Real Party in Interest filed her appeal coram non 
judice , which is to say, IN THE WRONG COURT. 
Absolutely every statute or rule imposing the filing of a notice of 
appeal for trial de novo of a small claims action concomitantly specifies 
where it should be filed: "...must file a Notice of Appeal (Form K) in the 
court issuing the judgment..." (Small Claims Procedure Rule 12(b)); "...by 
filing a notice of appeal in the original trial court..." (U.C.A. §78-6-10(1)); 
"...by filing a notice of appeal in the court issuing the judgment..." (C.J.A. 
Rule 4-803(2)(A)). (underlining and italics added) 
And if that happens to be a justice court rather than the small claims 
department of a district court (the only two possibilities), the following 
directs what is to happen next: 
"C.J.A. Rule 4-803(2) (F) Procedures - Record of justice court. 
Within ten days of the filing of the notice of appeal in a justice court, the 
court shall transmit to the district court the notice of appeal, the district 
courtfees, a certified copy of the docket or register of actions, and the 
original of all pleadings, notices, motions, orders, judgment, and other 
papers filed in the case." (Italics and underlining added) 
O.k., what it boils down to is this: If it's a justice court that first heard 
the case, you send them a notice of appeal and $80. The justice court 
then skims $10 off the top (its cut), and sends the notice of appeal, the 
36 
record (such as it is for a court of no record), and $70 up to the district 
court. The district court then dockets the case for trial de novo. 
Now as to what took place (the res gestae) in the present matter, you 
fortuitously don't have to take my word for it; the account of the adverse 
counsel in his opposing brief, and the record, can be referred to. His 
rendition is perhaps self-contradictory, but here's what he says: 
(quoting opposing brief of adverse counsel at p. 6) "...paid the 
$70.00 filing fee...after a telephone call requesting confirmation of the 
amount due with the Third District Court Clerk." (italics added) 
Contrasting at p. 7 with: «...spoke with a clerk at the Justice Court 
requesting the amount of the filing fee in the appeal of this matter." 
(italics added) 
But hell, these two statements ain't irreconcilable. Quite 
obviously—in a pig's behind rather!—clerks of both courts must have 
been contacted about the fee amount. 
And here, inconsistent with one of the preceding statements (and two 
more that follow), we have Janet Layosa's affidavit: 
"7. ...I requested a check in the amount of $70.00 which was 
attached to the letter from Richard Barnes in his letter transmitting the 
Notice of Appeal to the Justice Court, (italics added) 
Which conflicts with adverse counsel's brief at p. 6 under Statement of 
Facts: 
"3. Counsel's office was informed that the $70.00 filing fee should 
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be sent to the District Court. See id. [i.e., see affidavit of Janet Layosa]" 
(italics added) 
"4. The $70.00 filing fee (required by Section 78-7-35) was 
sent to the District Court. See letter dated February 12, 2003 from 
Richard N. Barnes to the Clerk of the Court, at Record 41-42." (italics 
added) 
I believe that the above citation to the record is incorrect; the Notice 
of Appeal and Richard N. Barnes' cover letter attendant to it, both dated 
February 12&, 2003, are at pp. 39-40 thereof. But by all means, DO 
INDEED TAKE A LOOK AT THEM. I've even put copies of both in the 
Addendum (see Exhibits "A" and "B") to aid you in such an examination. 
NOW HERE'S THE REAL STORY OF WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 
(which, apart from adverse counsel's own above admissions. I also know 
from talking to the clerks of both the justice and district courts): The 
Notice of Appeal and $70 and the docket of the justice court proceedings 
(and any filings therein) should have come to the district court from the 
justice court. BUT CONTRARY TO THREE SEPARATE PROVISIONS—of a 
statute, a procedural rule, and a rule of court—adverse counsel mailed 
$70 and his notice of appeal directly to the district court. Now it was an 
obvious tip-off from the case no. cited in the notice of appeal that this was 
a justice court case. SO the district court clerk rang down to the justice 
court and said, "We've got everything we need here, except the docket 
of the proceedings from your tribunal and any pleadings filed therein. 
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Send those up to us." THEN the district court clerk merely docketed the 
case for trial de novo. 
Only the district court clerk never inquired of the justice court as to 
whether a $10 check had been mailed to them separately or not. And 
the TRUE QUESTION AT ISSUE HERE is: Did the district court clerk have 
an affirmative duty to make such an inquiry? Well, if she did, it 
represents a far, far different matter than anything the appellate courts 
have addressed per the case law cited by adverse counsel. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
JUST TWO MORE POINTS, and then I close: 
1.) "Familiarity breeds contempt", or so the old maxim goes. Kevin 
Tanner, who wrote the opposing brief on behalf of adverse counsel, has 
no delusions about how sharp-eyed or nimble-witted appellate court law 
clerks are. He once did a stint himself with the Court of Appeals. So 
nobody knows better than he how easily they can be thrown off the scent 
by a little sly misdirection. And here's the proof of it: 
The present case now proceeds at bar only because a petition for 
rehearing was granted. And in its aforetime order dismissing this action, 
the honorable Court voiced the following: 
"The petition for extraordinary relief is denied. Petitioner has not 
demonstrated the notice of appeal of small claims judgment was filed 
in the wrong court, regardless of any technical errors in the caption 
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of the notice, and has not demonstrated the payment of filing fees 
was jurisdictional/' (bolder typeface and underlining added) 
Those discrepant statements made by adverse counsel in his brief 
should prevent this hereafter, but how did he previously get the 
honorable Court to buy the idea that the Notice of Appeal was merely 
miscaptioned rather than filed in the wrong court? Well, if you'll hark 
back to my initial brief at p. 16, adverse counsel was able to capitalize 
upon and get mileage from Tooele Justice Court and Third District Court, 
Tooele Dept., both sharing the same address 47 S. Main Street, Tooele. 
And while you're back there, note the point I made about adverse 
counsel's cagey use of ambiguity in always referring indistinctly to the 
"Tooele Court", as at p. 10 of his opposing brief. But it seems he can 
make it work though. And as one devious son of a bitch forced to 
concede the slick dexterity of another, I have to grudgingly admire his 
deft ability to hocus-pocus the honorable Court. 
2.) Well, say anything often enough and it will come to be believed, I 
guess. At p. 10 of adverse counsel's brief, he recites with grieved 
plaintiveness: "It was not until after the expiration of the ten day appeal 
period that Petitioner brought the error to the attention of the parties 
through his Motion to Dismiss." Mother of God! Has the man no 
shame? Please attentively regard the refutation of this found at p. 11 of 
my initial brief, and the gainsaying document at p. 48 of the record. 
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Conclusion and Precise Relief Sought 
From the foregoing facts and argument, presented to refute the 
contentions of adverse counsel's brief in opposition, it is evident and 
clear that (a.) it is highly suspect and totally unproven that any justice 
court clerk ever misguided or misinformed adverse counsel or his staff as 
to the amount of the filing fee due on appeal de novo of the small claims 
action, and only hearsay has been adduced to maintain this, (b.) even 
assuming arguendo that such misdirection was ever provided by a clerk, 
it was improperly sought and relied upon by adverse counsel or his staff, 
because a clerk cannot render legal advice, and it has been 
demonstrated that such it would be, (c.) the fee schedule charts provided 
on the Utah State Courts' website pertain only to sums due in district 
courts and not justice courts, and hence adverse counsel wrongly 
maintains that he was misled by them, and (d.) the case law, displayed 
by adverse counsel to assert that, in similar circumstances, the appellate 
courts have held that parties are not to be prejudiced by the missteps of 
court clerks, does not apply. Because the Real Party in Interest confused 
the situation by filing her Notice of Appeal in the wrong tribunal. 
Therefore the Court is prayed to hold for the Petitioner in this matter, and 
issue its writ of prohibition to the district court, directing that it cannot 
assume jurisdiction, and further directing it to enter an order of dismissal 
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of the cause of the Defendant/Real Party in Interest on appeal. 
»th DATED this 12— day of January/ 2004. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Clifton W. Panos pro se 
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PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
10 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -2060 
Telephone: (801) 355-7007 
Facsimile: (801) 355-6006 
February 12,2003 
Third District Court 
Tooele County, 
Small Claims Department 
47 South Main #141 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
RE: Panos v. Castle 
Civil No. 02-31 
OurFiIeNo.Allied-413 
Dear Clerk of the Court: 
Please file the enclosed original: 
1. NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
Please also find enclosed our check in the amount of $70.00 for the appeal. Please return 
your receipt in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope. 
Very truly yours, 
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